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INVESTMENT ·SECURITIES 
By 
THOMAS H. JOLLS* 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
1173 
Of the seven or eight cases Feviewed by the Subcommittee, two are 
noteworthy. 
Notice to Purchaser of Incomplete Stock Certificate 
An important Article 8 case decided in late 1968 is Dempsey-
Tegeler & Co. v. Otis Oil & Gas Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 
1968) in which plaintiff, a purchaser of 300,000 shares brought a 
diversity action in federal court to recover damages for the issuer's re-
fusal to register transfer of the shares. The court denied all parties' 
motions for summary judgment and ordered trial. Plaintiff was there-
after successful on the merits, but the court's ultimate findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are evidently not reported. Dempsey-
Tegeler & Co. v. Otis Oil & Gas Corp., Civ. Act. No. C-709 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 17, 1969). 
Tilton, the original owner of the shares and a defendant, directed 
plaintiff, a broker-dealer, to sell the shares and delivered the certificates 
to plaintiff. The latter arranged to sell the shares to a third party, and 
as the shares were sold, plaintiff remitted proceeds from time to time 
to Tilton, the owner. In accord with common market practice, plain-
tiff, prior to delivering the certificates to the third party, requested the 
issuer to register transfer of the shares into plaintiff's name. The issuer, 
however, refused, contending that ( 1) the shares had never been 
validly issued, and (2) inany event that plaintiff was not a purchaser 
for value and without notice of a defect to be described later. Plaintiff 
claimed damages because it could perform its delivery obligations to 
the third party only by purchasing shares on the open market at a 
price in excess of the contract price. / · 
The affidavits supporting the summary judgment motions revealed 
that the stock certificates had been "wrongfully removed" from the 
iss.uer's stock book by the corporate secretary who had negotiated 
them without authority, with the result that they eventually came into 
Tilton's possession. The affidavits also showed that the stock certificates 
had facsimile rather than manual signatures, but carried no manual 
countersignatures, nor any statement that absence of manual counter-
signatures would invalidate the certificates. However, the Colorado 
* Member of the Illinois Bar; Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, the College of William and Mary; Chairman of the Subcommittee on In-
vestment Securities. This survey was prepared with the assistance of Subcommit-
tee members William Mellon Eaton, Ernest L. Folk, III, Egon Guttman, James 
D. Pinkerton, Donald H. Remmers, and Samuel L. Rosenberry. 
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corporation statute, which applied to the issuer, provides that the re-
quired signatures on a stock certificate may be facsimiles "if the certifi- · 
cate is countersigned by a transfer agent, or registered by a registrar, 
other than the corporation itself or an employee of the corporation. "1 
The court tacitly assumed that manually affixed countersignatures are 
necessary to validate a certificate with facsimile signatures, since the 
statute provides that shares "shall be represented" by certificates signed 
by named officers, and then authorizes facsimile signatures if there are 
appropriate countersignatures. 
The ultimate question was whether the issuer must register transfer 
of these shares. Under The Uniform Commercial Code, assuming com-
pliance with certain formal requirements which were concededly met 
in this case, the issuer must register transfer of shares when presented 
by a "bona fide purchaser."2 The operative issue was whether the 
purchaser of the shares was indeed a "bona fide purchaser." This 
turned upon section 8-202(2) (a)'s provision that a security with a 
"defect going to its validity," is nonetheless valid in the hands of a 
"purchaser for value and without notice of the particular defect." Since 
the stock certificate lacked the required countersignatures, the issuer 
claimed that the purchaser had notice of the defect, while the pur-
chaser claimed that it knew nothing about the irregularity. The court 
held, as indeed the parties conceded, that neither the plaintiff nor 
Tilton had actual notice of the defect. In its published opinion the court 
analyzed the general definition of "notice" in section 1-201 (25) and 
found that ( 1) the purchaser lacked "actual knowledge" of the defect, 
( 2) it had not received "notification" of the defect, and ( 3) there 
were no "facts or circumstances" which would give the purchaser 
"reason to know" of the defect. In its unreported final judgment the 
court found as a fact that neither plaintiff nor Tilton had actual knowl-
edge of any defect in the certificates nor of any facts or circumstances 
which would put them on notice of the unauthorized issue of the cer-
. tificates or deficiency resulting from the lack of a manual counter-
signature (Finding No. 11). Moreover, neither had actual notice of the 
Colorado statute requiring such a countersignature (Finding No. 12). 
Rather than grant summary judgment for the purchaser, the court 
called for trial because of a "residual troublesome question" whether 
notice of the irregularity in the certificates would be imputed to the 
purchaser because the Colorado statute requires that facsimile stock 
certificates carry manual countersignatures. "This is, after all, a matter 
of law as to which there is a presumption of knowledge."3 
This cryptic statement, not elaborated in the opinion, raises many 
and settles few issues. It is obviously a holding that imputed knowledge 
of a legal requirement relating to the validity of a security may be 
1. Colo. Rev. Stat. §31-4-8. 
2. See §8-401 (l)(e). 
3. 293 F. Supp. at 1387. 
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equivalent to "notice" which precludes the protected status of a pur-
chaser for value without notice, and thus will, in appropriate circum-
stances (not further defined), excuse the issuer from a duty to register 
transfer of securities into the name of the purchaser to whom the knowl-
edge is imputed. 
The implications of this proposition are disturbing. Logically, it 
could destroy the independent effectiveness of section 8-202 ( 2) (a) 
which validates a security with a "defect going to its validity" if held 
by a purchaser for value without notice of the defect. Section 8-202 
(2) (a) obviously is intended to cover defects due to some non-
conformity with a statutory requirement. If a purchaser for value ipso 
facto has "notice" of a defect because he is presumed to know the legal 
requirement giving rise to the defect, it would follow that no security 
with such a defect could be validated under section 8-202(2) (a). The 
court's proposition that one is charged with knowledge of a "matter 
of law" could imply that one always and necessarily has "notice" of 
a defect which takes the form of noncompliance with a statutory re-
quirement. This violates the purpose of section 8-202(2) (a) which is 
intended to validate securities with various defects, and if sustained, it 
would gut section 8-202(2) (a) of that essential function. In order to 
give full effect to this provision, the courts should hold that the "pre-
sumption of knowledge" of matters of law is not the kind of "notice" 
which will preclude a holder from asserting the protection of section 
8-202(2) (a). Instead, the proper inquiry should be whether the pur-
chaser had "notice" in the sense of section 1-201(25), and that looks 
to actual knowledge, notification, or reason to know implied from facts 
and circumstances. Indeed, it was one of the purposes of the Code to 
get away from the uncertainties of pre-Code law which had so liberally 
recognized constructive notice of facts. 
Although the court wrote no opinion on final judgment, there was 
a "finding" that the Colorado statute requiring manual countersigna-
tures did not of itself give notice of the claimed defect in the certificates, 
since in the court's view, "the type of notice contemplated by" section 
8-202(2) (a) "must be such as to be equivalent to actual notice" 
(Finding No. 13). Previously, the court had also "found" that lack of 
the statutorily required countersignature ."does not constitute a de-
ficiency which creates an absolute defense on the certificates and does 
not render the certificates void or bring a halt to their negotiability" 
(Finding No. 9). 
Apparently the question of actual notice to the plaintiff was not 
urged. But the certificates delivered to the plaintiff, a firm presumably 
versed in securities handling, were anomalous on their face and should 
themselves have given rise to inquiry. The requirement of Colorado 
law that a certificate bearing facsimile signatures of corporate officers 
must be manually signed by a transfer agent or transfer clerk, and/ or 
registrar, is by no means unusual. Putting it another way, there is no 
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State in the Union which permits the use of facsimile signatures of offi-
cers on stock certificates without at least one manual verifying counter-
signature. Thus it may be safely generalized that if the plaintiff, a repu-
table dealer in securities, and a member firm of the New York Stock 
Exchange, had handled a total of 10,000 stock certificates in its offices 
on the day it took in the Otis Oil & Gas Company certificates, these 
latter would have been the only certificates it handled which bore no 
manual signature. A diligent and experienced securities clerk should 
have challenged these certificates as out of line with basic require-
ments. Indeed, a meticulous layman might well have questioned the 
certificates as being the only ones having no manual signature anywhere 
he had ever seen in a lifetime of investing. It is submitted that the plain-
tiff as a professional serving the public in securities transactions should 
have been considered as in possession of facts giving reason to know 
that the certificate was defective, and thus was "on notice." 
Of course, the question of notice to the plaintiff, actual or construc-
tive, becomes moot in the face of the Court's conclusion that the seller, 
Tilton, was not on notice of any defect and that as a purchaser for 
value from Tilton the plaintiff had acquired all of Tilton's rights under 
the "umbrella" provision of section 8-301. , 
It was also contended that non-compliance with the statutory sig-. 
nature requirements made the securities non-genuine, so that the issuer 
would have an absolute defense against even a purchaser for value and 
without notice.4 The court, however, correctly rejected this argument. 
The certificates were clearly genuine, since they came from the issuer's 
stockbook, they carried facsimile signatures of the required officers, and 
there were no forged or counterfeit signatures. Issuance of even ir-
regular certificates without authority does not mean that the certificates 
lack genuineness which, under the Code, means absence of forgery or 
counterfeiting. 5 
Irrespective of the technicalities of the Code, there are inescapable 
faults in the position of the corporation. It undertook the preparation 
of stock certificates bearing facsimile signatures, without customary 
language as to countersignature. To compound the difficulty, it failed 
to establish proper custodial and accounting control of the certificates, 
leaving them to be handed out at will by the Secretary. Estoppel doc-
trine, permitted by section 1-103, could well be invoked against the 
corporation, who bears the responsibility for allowing the certificates 
to be placed in circulation as commercial instruments. As between the 
corporation and Tilton, it having been established that the corporation 
was substantially connected with the certificates, Tilton should clearly 
prevail, having had no notice of the defect. As between the corporation 
and the plaintiff, it would seem that the plaintiff should likewise prevail. 
In balancing the equities between the person who negligently permitted 
4. See section 8-303 ( 3). 
5. See section 1-201 ( 18). 
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the certificates to be launched in commercial channels, and the person 
who negligently relied on the certificates, the assessment of blame 
should fall on the one who initiated the problem and was in the best 
position to control it. · 
Levy on Shares Without Surrender of Certificate 
In Progressive Forwarding Inc. v. Cander Realty Corp., N.Y. Law 
Journal May 6, 1969, p. 2, 6 UCC Rep. 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.),. a judg-
ment creditor was granted an order directing Cander Realty Corp. to 
cancel an unsurrendered certificate of its stock registered in the name 
of the judgment debtor and directing Cander to issue a new certificate 
and deliver it to the sheriff for sale at public auction. 
The court found that the certificate bore a legend to the effect that 
sale or other transfer of the shares represented thereby was subject to 
the terms and conditions of an agreement of July 25, 1944, between 
the corporation and its stockholders. By virtue of this legend, and 
apparently without regard to what the terms of the agreement of July 
25, 1944 might be, the court held inapplicable section 8-317 requiring 
seizure of the outstanding certificate, the location of the certificate be-
ing unknown and the principal defendant being outside the jurisdiction. 
The court said: 
"However, where such a restrictive covenant as above set forth ap-
pears on the face of the docu~ent, the corporation is the proper gar-
nishee as a bona fide purchaser of the outstanding certificate and would 
be thereby protected." (emphasis supplied) 
It is difficult to see how the issuer corporation can be denominated a 
"purchaser" of anything-least of all the outstanding certificate. The 
court cited a previous New York Supreme Court case, Neidorf v. 
Neidorf, 43 Misc. 2d 710, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 354 (1964), decided prior 
to the Code but under a similar statutory requirement for seizure of 
the certificate. But in that case the court had analyzed the agreement 
referred to in the legended certificate and found that the covenants 
therein made it impossible to transfer the shares without offering them 
first to the corporation and other stockholders. It was held that the 
purpose of the statute had been satisfied in that the transfer of the 
certificate had been effectively prevented. This proposition might be 
challenged; moreover it is not clear that in this action, which was one 
for sequestration of the stock in a matrimonial proceeding, there was 
to be any order for issuance of a replacement certificate as in Cander. 
It is submitted that the decision in Cander is clearly wrong. The re-
striction on the debtor's right to transfer may have been minimal; 
minimal or not, a third party could have purchased the shares on the 
faith of the outstanding certificate taking them subject to whatever im-
pediments or encumbrances might have existed under the agreement 
of July 25, 1944. 
Indeed, the order making the new certificate (presumably subject to 
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the same restriction) available for sale on execution would necessarily 
contemplate that someone would be willing to purchase the shares sub-
ject to the restriction. 
Section 8-105 provides "Securities governed by this Article are 
negotiable instruments." It would seem that the contract noticed in the 
legend would be nothing more than an "adverse claim" (section 
8-30 1). A purchaser of the original certificate would not be a bona 
fide purchaser (section 8-302) but the judgment debtor as the person 
specified in the certificate as owner would have power to indorse (sec-
tion 8-308) and upon delivery of the original certificate the purchaser 
would acquire his rights, whatever they might be (section 8-301). Also 
see section 8-202 ( 4) : 
"All other defenses of the issuer including nondelivery and 
conditional delivery of the security are ineffective against a pur-
chaser for value who has taken without notice of the particular 
defense."6 
It is difficult to see how in Cander a new certificate could be issued 
without constituting an overissue. The same result would ensue in 
Neidorf if the Code were applicable thereto. 
6. The rule under Article 8 is different from that under Article 3 (Com-
mercial Paper). As to the latter, one cannot be a "holder in due course" unless 
he is without notice of any defense (section 3-302); having notice of a defense he 
is not a holder in due course and is subject to all defenses (section 3-306). 
